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“¿Una Nueva Forma de Guerra?
Terrorismo: Viejo y Nuevo”

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Proposal and Framework

International Relations are current events that have always drawn my attention. They have been intricate and often involve many different points of view from several nations. I have chosen to translate this essay from Spanish into English because I felt it would be of use to the course that is offered at ULACIT called “Relaciones Internacionales”. The subject of terrorism, spoken about in the article, is a current and ongoing theme and has become more and more of a problem for nearly every nation of the World as the years have gone by. Even though the article was written a few decades ago, one can quickly see that the problems are still present and that we are experiencing repercussions from many of the conflicts mentioned in the article.

The article makes reference to specific problems in the Middle East, the Far East and Northern Africa. It refers to intrigue and plotting that, at that time, was not fully confirmed but for which there was great suspicion. The writer speaks about the history of terrorism and how it was used by nations since the beginning of history in order to reach their often corrupt and immoral plans. He writes about the objectives of using terrorism and how terrorists will manipulate the minds of the people to get what they want. The article speaks about the main features of terrorism, or what terrorists would use in order to influence the international community and juxtapose them against each other.

Finally, it also mentions how official governments are led into having to deal with the rogue regimes in order to reduce the influence they could have on the international community by making agreements with them, when it is for their own good or the good of their citizens. The justifications for these actions have not always been clear, and often have not been divulged until after the facts have come to light. Neither have they always been successful in obtaining their desired objective, seeing as the governments were dealing with people whose integrity was obviously questionable.

The conclusion explains that terrorism in general usually does not reach its ultimate objective of overthrowing an existing government and establishing a new one that is better. It has been a waste of money, lives, and resources most of the time. It also sets the scene for future failures, seeing as there will most likely be repercussions from

other factions. All in all, it is not a solution on the international stage. International Relations have benefitted from dialog and compromise, and efforts should be made to resolve crises' in this way and not by random acts of terror.

I think that this article will be of help in teaching students at the University to grasp a more comprehensive view of what has gone on in the World as far as terrorist conflicts and how they were solved, and it will also show that these conflicts are part of our international community today.

The techniques and methods that have been used in doing this translation have been taken from former textbooks, handouts and lectures that were accumulated during my studies at ULACIT. They consist of studying the Source Text for meaning of content, making a draft translation and proofreading. It was not a particularly complicated text, but there was a need to be more informed about current events and World history.

Disclaimer

La traducción que usted leerá a continuación ha sido realizada por razones académicas, como proyecto de graduación de la carrera Bachillerato en Traducción y Enseñanza de Inglés de la Universidad Latinoamericana de Ciencia y Tecnología. Esta es una traducción parcial que comprende de la página 259 a la página 273 del Libro El Análisis de las Relaciones Internacionales, del autor Karl W. Deutsch.

14. A different kind of warfare? Terrorism: Old and new

In its broadest sense, *terrorism* is the tactic of using an act or threat of violence against individuals or groups to change the outcome of any political process.

Classic terrorism was directed at the elimination of individuals. The old tactical tyrannicide was advocated and practised for many centuries. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BC and the attempt on Adolf Hitler's life, on July 20, 1944, are well-known examples. With the death of the ruler, it was hoped that the Government would change, but often this was not the case.

Generally, assassinations of leaders do not touch or change political systems. The attack may fail, as did the attack on Hitler in 1944, or can be successful, as was the attack on Russia Tsar Alexander II in 1884, when he was replaced by Tsar Alexander III, while the old system of autocratic government continued. Similarly, the first Minister of India, Indira Gandhi / was murdered in 1984, but the Hindu democratic system continued with her son Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister. When United States President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, his successor, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, assumed office within an hour and major policies of the country continued. Since then, speculation has often pointed to a different address. Would President John F. Kennedy have involved the United States less deeply in Vietnam than Lyndon B. Johnson? Or would the pressure of U.S. public opinion throughout the 1960's have had almost the same result under any of the Presidents? Would the history of the Soviet Union have been different if Lenin had not been so weakened by injuries from Fanny Kaplan's attempt on his life in 1920? Would the German Communist movement after the First World War have been more effective if two of its first leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, had not been killed by right-wing soldiers in January 1919?

We will never know with certainty, but I am inclined to answer "no" or "not much" to these questions. It seems to me that large populations and large organizations themselves possess enormous inertia. They change, but only slowly, and the sudden elimination of one or some individuals that class terrorism tries to achieve, has a limited effect except under very exceptional and rare conditions.

A second form of terror of the old strain consists of the ruler appealing to the loyalty of some or many of his subjects. "Is there anyone to free me of this priest?", reportedly exclaimed the King Henry II of England to his court, and four knights dutifully murdered Archbishop Thomas á Becket at Canterbury Cathedral altar. This happened in the 12th century, but in the 1930's T.S. Elliot wrote the play *murder in the Cathedral*. In the 1980s, Archbishop Romero of the small Central American Republic of El Salvador was killed at the altar of his cathedral by agents or proponents, as is believed widely, by the authoritarian regime in that country.

In the 1970s, it was reported that the establishment of the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile through a Coup d'état cost 20,000 lives. In addition, a prominent exiled 'anti-Pinochetista', Orlando Letelier, was assassinated in Washington, D.C., with a bomb in his car by an agent of that Government, who was apprehended and convicted. In another act of terrorism, two Bulgarian exiles opposed to his Government were killed; it was reported, by an attack with the poisoned tip of an umbrella.

The most dramatic and ominous case of a murder with government support of a prominent individual was the assassination in Sarajevo of the Austrian Archduke and heir-presumptive to the throne, Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este, on June 28, 1914. The murder was executed by a nationalist student, Gabriel Princip, but the entire operation had been organized and supported carefully by the Intelligence division of the War Ministry of Serbia (then part of the Yugoslavia). It caused the war between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia and then, in less than six weeks, led to the First World War, a war that certainly the Governments of several great powers already expected and for which they were prepared.

Government terror has not confined itself to attacks on a few individuals. During the First World War, the Turkish Government of Enver Pasha deported up to 1.5 million Armenians – men, women and children – by forced marches. It is said that when asked where these people were sent, a Turkish officer replied "to nothing". And in fact, almost all of these Armenians perished.

Objectives that terrorists hope to achieve

Occasionally, there may be an expression of terrorism, where the terrorists act only to release their pent-up feelings of bitterness, anger and frustration. But the most complex acts, particularly against well-defined targets, require long preparation and an emotional support system. This type of terrorism rarely finds these resources, unless the feelings of anger are expressed in a larger ethnic, religious or social group. These feelings may possibly not endure.

To obtain more reliable support, terrorists must have a goal that seems at least attainable. The removal of a key person or group that is considered to be an enemy and can be linked in this way to the hope of direct, significant and lasting results. This is a hope which normally proves unrealistic, even though the act of terror may succeed.

Since the 19th century, major hopes have sprung from the indirect effects of terrorism. The masses of the Russian people had begun to adopt the revolutionary sentiment according to the theories of Russian anarchist Michael Bakunin and Sergei Nechaev, as well as the Russian movement "The People's Will" from the late 1870, and the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) political party in the 1890s. This was an act of spectacular terror that would serve as a signal to precipitate their repressed emotions and coordinate their actions.

This theory of terrorism "as a sign" of "propaganda by the facts" also won favour from time to time in other countries, such as Italy, Spain and Latin America. Terrorist anarchists managed to carry out several spectacular assassinations, but did not obtain power in any country in the world.

Finally, terrorists may seek to attract attention and provoke fear. In modern industrial democracies, the attention of the media - press, radio, film and TV - is often easily attracted by almost any behaviour that is strange and spectacular enough. Even acts of terror, mild as blowing up mailboxes, on behalf of the separatist nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales and Corsica, caught the full attention of national and foreign media.

Engendering fear in a modern democracy is more difficult. Since people have the freedom to speak, write, vote and run for Office in the elections, they automatically assume that terrorist groups are small minorities who may not win the election and whose

views are too extreme to consider them suitable coalition partners. In short, they are unpopular at the national level. If this minority then causes fear through the terrorist acts of some of its members, it is soon hated and likely to become the object of acts of repression. Only if the minority is relatively large, and predominates in some distinctive territory away from the centres of interest and power of the majority, are there possibilities that the majorities will leave the problematic minorities and their territories alone. In this way, various combinations of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and a conducive international atmosphere eventually led to the independence of Ireland in 1922, Israel in 1948 and Cyprus in 1960.

Terrorism and guerrillas

When one of the parties in armed conflict is not strong enough to send uniformed troops more or less permanently to the battlefield, it can resort to guerrilla warfare. These fighters do not possess uniforms or other permanent identification. They come out from the population for some armed coup and return into it. Between attacks they often survive due to scattering, by concealing almost invisibly, or by retiring towards peripheral regions that are remote and inaccessible. They destroy the facilities and the local enemy communications, kill or kidnap important people and attack individuals of the population that collaborate, or are suspected of collaborating, with the enemy. In this way, they encourage their own comrades, show that their faction is still in the fight, and scare and discourage their enemies.

In these wars of concealment and intimidation, the information is both an instrument and an objective of the fight. Knowledge of the plans, the location and the staff of the opponent must be obtained by any means and at any cost, and therefore they have to instil fear in him. The rules and modern civilized war conventions do not apply here. Often, deceit and cruelty are used extensively in acts of reprisal and retaliation. In the struggle for control of a territory, according to two members of the United States Department of Intelligence, they try to teach their inhabitants to fear over the Government authorities more than the rebels.

In the long term, the result of these cumulative guerrilla terror campaigns can follow a quantitative model. Each party should recruit fighters and keep them, and try to

maintain fairly high *index of recruitment* and continue to be an effective force. But each party also loses elements from dead, wounded and sick in battle, and sometimes even more from desertion or silencing. If the *rate of attrition* of a party is higher than the rate of recruitment, it will eventually disappear. Similarly, if the relationship between recruitment and attrition of a party is more favorable than the equivalent relationship of the other, the favoured faction will have more chances of winning the contest. Unless other conditions come into play, such as levels of the initial force, the quality of the generals, geography, logistics and technological advantages, it is possible that the effect of the relationship between recruitment and attrition will prevail.

In this sense, terrorism has only two uses: to cause fear and discouragement in its opponents, and it risks increasing its likelihood of extinction. In addition, it can cause resentment and indignation in the official media and increase the rate of recruitment of the latter. If the effect *provocateur* of the terrorism is greater than the intimidation, the results can be counterproductive for the terrorist party (or the more spectacular terrorist).

Some more subtle versions of modern terrorism theories have tried to address this problem. According to one theory, the revolutionaries who are carrying out acts of terror do not expect to lead the revolution of the masses but the Government repression. The latter then, according to this view, becomes dictatorial, cruel and fascist, i.e. will be forced to "remove the mask", and will be totally unpopular. So, the Government itself will lead "the masses" to a revolutionary State and the rebels will have the opportunity to lead. But this theory has not worked in any industrial democracy. It is possible to incite the Government and the privileged classes so that they have an extreme reaction, but the terrorists remain unpopular. And when a repressive regime falls, as in Greece in the 1970's, the majority of the people will want democracy, freedom of expression and more security for their people and their rights. The activities of small groups in France, Italy, and West Germany that brought about a series of repressions and the subsequent revolution likewise failed.

Modern terrorism and subliminal war

Modern terrorism has six features:

1. Acts have become much *more frequent*, reaching hundreds of incidents per year in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

2. Terror is more frequently directed against *weak goals* i.e., against individuals and facilities that are not important enough to be heavily protected. Some prominent people have figured among its victims. The Prime Minister of Italy, Aldo Moro; of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel; of Egypt, Anwar Sadat; India, Indira Gandhi and Sweden, Olof Palme, who were killed in the 1980s, and Pope John Paul II who was wounded. German terrorists of the "faction of the Red Army (RAF)" chose victims of intermediate level, important enough to be well known but not enough to be strongly protected, like the banker Jürgen Ponto and federal prosecutor Martin Buback.

But most of the attacks have been directed to less important objectives. At the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Arab terrorists killed the team of athletes from Israel. In Italy, passengers died when a bomb exploded in the Bologna train station. Arab attacks on Israeli buses, schools and civil aircraft became more frequent. At the end of the decade of 1970 - 1980, Arab terrorists kidnapped international commercial aircraft to Mogadishu, Entebbe, Cyprus and Karachi, and each time got a lot of publicity. Terrorism in Beirut has occupied the front pages and the television screens in many countries for several years.

3. The perpetration of such acts requires preparation, money, weapons and explosives, places to hide and sanctuaries to escape to. It seems clear that this has become available to a much larger extent. Modern terrorism is based on one *organizational support* greater than before the early 1960s. Perhaps this decade, with the spectacular assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, US Attorney General, Attorney Robert Kennedy and the Reverend Martin Luther King, marked a sort of milestone with global waves of publicity that followed each of these events.

4. The *media* reported the terrorist acts with sensationalism, which was used in order to draw attention to their causes and messages. In this way, the communication media have become an unintentional link in the growing spiral of terrorism.

5. Much of modern terrorism is *supported by Governments*. This is done by money, diplomatic facilities, passports, sanctuaries, experts, training camps, arms, explosives and ideologies of justification. The same terrorists who are called "criminals" and "bandits" by foreign Governments have been targeted, while they are hailed as "freedom fighters" or "national liberation soldiers" by the Governments that support them. Several Arab States, in particular Libya and Syria, appear to have had training camps not only for the Palestinians and other Arab nationalists, but also for various European terrorists from countries whom they consider allies. There has been a similar cooperation between various terrorist movements in Europe and Arab groups with regard to trade and clandestine international transport of weapons, again frequently with the involvement of a Government.

Some Governments support these activities, but do so in the context of denial, trying to conceal the involvement of their staff and the traces of their actions. These attempts at concealment sometimes fail. In 1986, a British court formally established the involvement of Syrian diplomats in London in a failed attempt to put a bomb on a plane of the Israeli airline "El Al" carrying more than 100 passengers. Great Britain then broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, and United States and the Federal Republic of Germany followed suit.

Also in 1986, a court in West Berlin established the involvement of Libyan nationals in the explosion of a bomb at a nightclub, which killed two American soldiers. President Reagan subsequently ordered an air-strike on the capital of Libya, Trípoli, and another city where President Muamar Khaddafi was with his family. President Khaddafi was unharmed, but it was reported that one of his daughters was killed in the attack.

As far as the Soviet Bloc is concerned, the Bulgarian Press has been mentioned frequently in the West as the primary conduit used by terrorists to carry out their activities. However, the Soviet Union has been a active participant in major arms deliveries to Syria, Libya and Iraq, and partly with the help of Cuban troops, in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

In the West, the United States is the main supplier of weapons, but Germany, France and Britain are also significant sources. Much of it occurs more or less openly, sometimes through commercial channels as a result of claims of political motivation, or, as in the United States, through formal or informal military assistance.

But some covert activities of the United States went further. Going back to 1961, after some early incursions backed by this country, a force of Cuban exiles trained and equipped secretly by the Government of the United States launched an invasion of Cuba. The company, which began under the Government of President Eisenhower and then Vice- President Nixon was mobilized under the Government of President Kennedy and failed disastrously in the Bay of Pigs. At the end of 1962, the CIA was working on a plan to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro, which never materialized. In 1962, when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw their nuclear weapons from the island and the United States agreed to end their violent attacks against that country, the matter was buried.

The informal and clandestine war between the super-powers reached new levels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, which was then ruled by a Communist faction. They thus proceeded at the invitation of Babrak Karmal, leader of a rival Communist faction, who would have entered the country about the same time and apparently with Soviet aid. The result was a protracted civil war, which became a war between traditionalist Islamic tribes and the Government in Kabul backed by the Soviet Union. Islamic rebels received the continuous support of United States money and weapons, and Pakistan offered them sanctuaries to regroup and launch new raids on Afghanistan.

At the end of 1987 war was still continuing. There were some three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Afghanistan, with less than twenty million inhabitants, was terribly devastated, the regime of Soviet support in Kabul was under a new leader, Division General, Najibullah, who was far from popular and Soviet spokesmen now spoke of the provision of its country to accept a "non-aligned" Afghanistan under a Government of national unity, but with Soviet troops stationed there for some years. This is a proposal that still is not considered to be acceptable by the other party.

A new factor; the Islamic revolution in Iran

In 1978 the Shah of Iran's pro-U.S. dictatorship fell from power. The Shah had dreamed of making Iran a great power and had spent much of his country's oil wealth on American arms, royal ostentation and attempts to revive the glories of ancient pre-Islamic Persia. But he had terribly neglected the needs of his people. Most remained in poverty and firmly linked to their Shiite version of Islam. The Shah was overthrown by a double revolution, social and religious, of which the latter prevailed. Iran became an "Islamic Republic" and its religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, has remained as the ultimate judge of power so far. The ayatollah and the new Iranian Government condemned Russia and the United States as incarnations of Satan, and began to export the idea of an "Islamic" revolution to other countries. They had particular success in Lebanon, where in 1983 an Islamic revolutionary with connections in Iran took a truck loaded with explosives to an American marines' camp and held them as hostages. The United States imposed an embargo on sales of arms to Iran and urged its allies to do the same.

Elsewhere, the administration of President Reagan was more warlike. To strengthen the exiled anti-government Contras from Nicaragua, he equipped and financed them, thereby prolonging their guerrilla war. In President Reagan's opinion it was possible that the Government could turn this small country into a "second Cuba" and there was a threat to United States. As a result, its overthrow seemed a matter of national security. In the course of the same campaign, the CIA blocked Nicaraguan ports for a period. The International Court in The Hague withdrew from the jurisdiction of the Court before its verdict.

The placing of mines did not occur again, but the *contra* war continued. The United States Congress, even when there was a Republican majority in the Senate, was reluctant to give a blank cheque to President Reagan to support the Contras. **They** only authorized \$ 70 million as "humanitarian help".

In the meantime, however, the functions of the National Security Council had been partially transformed, under the Reagan administration, from those of evaluation and coordination of intelligence to ones of covert operations in the field. This seemed

easy and attractive, seeing as at that time the Council was more involved in secrecy and had become less subject to the control of Congress.

Two staff members of the Council, Admiral John Poindexter and Colonel Oliver North, were involved in a complex maneuver. They entered into secret negotiations with some senior leaders and Iranian officials who were considered as moderate. Iran would use its influence with Lebanese terrorists to secure the release of the six American hostages. The United States would hand over smuggled weapons to Iran for its on-going war with Iraq. As a pledge of honesty, they would provide a significant amount of weapons prior to the release of the hostages. Eventually, three American hostages were released, but Lebanese pro-Iranian terrorists abducted three others in their place. As a result, Iran obtained a substantial amount of weapons, including *TOW 2000* anti-tank missiles.

The objective of the United States transaction was not to exchange hostages for weapons. After all, this was an act that rewarded the taking of hostages and was something that President Reagan had publicly stated that he was not going to do. Rather, the hope had been to divide the Iranian Government, strengthen what was considered its "moderate" wing, restore some influence in Iranian politics to the U.S, and eventually restore the Alliance between the two countries against the Soviet Union.

This expectation failed. The Iranian "moderates" accepted weapons and then loaded public abuse onto United States. Officially, at least, Iran continued to be as unfriendly as before.

But the operation produced money. Between 1985 and 1986, they handed over weapons to Iran mainly through Israeli reserves, while the United States was in charge of replacing them in Israel. The United States only gained \$ 12 million for the replacement. Between 1985 and 1986, weapons were surrendered to Iran mainly through Israeli reserves, while the United States was in charge of replacing them in Israel. Iran paid \$ 30 million for the armament, but Israel claimed only \$ 12 million from the United States for the replacement. The rest, perhaps some 18 million dollars, was deposited in Swiss bank accounts controlled by Poindexter and North.

According to some suggestions, these millions were re-channeled towards the Contras to finance its war against the Government of Nicaragua. This would have been

illegal under the law of the existing Congress at that time, which forbade spending public money in this fight. The spokesman for the Contras stated in addition that his faction had not received the money and that they had operated under hardship. When members of Congress and President Reagan asked for the matter to be explained in detail, Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North invoked the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and refused to testify on the basis of a possible self-incrimination. At the time of the drafting of this essay the 18 million dollars have not shown up.

President Reagan said that he was ignorant of the details of the case. The head of the CIA, William Casey, also refused to be involved, but shortly after was the subject of an operation on a brain tumor, which in fact eliminated him as a potential witness and soon died. All the intrigue was kept secret from Congress and the Presidential Cabinet, by order of President Reagan. So far, that was it. Meanwhile, the credibility of the Administration suffered terribly, which affected their allies, Congress, and their own people. It remains to be seen if an investigation of the new 100th Congress will shed more light on the issue and restore part of the loss of confidence.

Terrorism and secret war as political traps

Terrorism can become a self-perpetuating system. For this situation to develop there must be a significant social group that becomes extremely unhappy because many of its members feel oppressed politically, economically or socially. They can also feel bitterly disappointed in their struggle to realize some prized national, ethnic or religious ambition. Generally speaking, there are also some particularly impressionable individuals who, in an attempt to avenge some real or imagined ill, then assume the role of leaders in a future mass movement for its abolition, and who will attempt "pioneer" acts of terrorism.

Quite often, these terrorists and their actions produce a counter flow of terrorism and repression, and this causes more terrorism. The bloody cycle may continue for a long time until one side is exhausted, removes the original offenses or finds more promising ways to overcome them. Terrorism has existed, on a recurring basis in Ireland for more

than thirty years, in Italy for a few hundred years and in Spain for approximately eighty years.

Normally terrorism changes little and solves nothing. It consumes scarce resources in talent, dedicated manpower, troops, thought, and attention. In the long term, it frequently weakens the party which practices it and the country where it takes place. Guerrilla wars have a shorter life, but can last for decades, even without significant foreign aid, as in China before 1949, and as in regions of Colombia and the Philippines today. Occasionally, these guerrilla wars have become mass revolutions and some of them have achieved success, but these results are rare.

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare can become stronger and long-lasting if a foreign power intervenes secretly or even openly in its support. Most often, this is not a formal war. The intervening power can supply weapons, money, equipment, and intelligence, advisory and specialized, and even troops, although more or less discreetly. At the same time, it can hide and deny much of what it does, retiring from an unpromising contest with a loss of prestige and without putting the country and its population on a war footing, with all the costs and difficulties involved.

Such intervention can be successful, despite the fact that there is foreign intervention in favour of the other party in the conflict. In the Greek civil war of 1947, the United States and Britain supported the prevailing conservatives even when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia helped the Communists and leftists. Despite the impressive efforts of the Americans to assist the Government of South Vietnam with 500 thousand soldiers, but without the burden of a formal declaration of war, the Soviet Union and China helped North Vietnam and the revolutionaries of the Viet Cong to triumph finally in the civil war in 1965-1975.

However, more often, these conflicts drag on without conclusion for long periods, even with more or less secret foreign intervention. In early 1987, the United States was involved in supporting certain factions in the civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the Governments of these opposing parties in the conflicts in these countries. All these protracted conflicts did not result in a clear victory for either of the parties and their allies.

Terrorism constitutes a trap for political movements who practise it. It consumes key personnel, resources and attention. It decreases their ability to discover what to do about the real problems of their peoples and countries and to make commitments and coalitions needed to ensure that this is done. Eventually, it distorts the personalities of their leaders. It makes them less sensitive, less careful and more brutal and intolerant, even among themselves. In all these respects, their incidental costs are devastating.

And what about governments that support terrorism and clandestine war? Incidental costs are also high, not only manpower, treasury and equipment costs, but most importantly in reasoning and attention, realism, morality and in the time of its leaders that could be put to better use. In the end, clandestine wars may become open and small ones can become large wars. A great escalation would be entirely sufficient to finish off the superpowers, and also much of the rest of humanity. The potential gains from such conflicts are out of proportion to their possible risks and their likely costs. If the struggle for armaments and power resembles the drug of nations, then clandestine war is tantamount to the act of injecting poison into their veins.

Fortunately, many drug addicts survive and learn to control their habit or to get rid of it. Similarly, many nations have achieved success. Perhaps the larger and stronger powers may still have the same fate.

Reflection

This translation project has been a good culminating exercise after more than three years of being in the Translation and Teaching Major for a Bachelor's Degree at ULACIT. It was helpful that the article was free for the students to choose, while the Professor was there to guide the students as to the appropriateness of the chosen articles. The predefined format for the layout was provided in order to make sure the final translation would be easy to follow. The references are there to show that a specific structure was applied from already existing methodologies for translating. These have been followed to the extent that the translator felt they were appropriate for the type of text that is found herein. The translator welcomes any critique for possible mistakes or omissions that may be encountered by the readers.

The translation process was similar to previous translation homework made in other University classes about Technical Translation, Literature Translation, and English to Spanish and Spanish to English translation. The volume was evidently much larger, but the methodology applied essentially followed the same format. There was a reasonable amount of investigation that had to be made into the historic terms and references to wars and political events.

Once a draft was made into English, the biggest part of the work consisted of checking for correct synonyms and appropriate terminology. Considerable time was spent checking the context in order to assure that the most suitable word was used. This would often depend on what country and what event in history the author would be talking about. There was also some military technology that was specific to that specific time in history. Some research had to be done to be sure that the correct vocabulary was used for those types of incidents.

As the article shifted its focus to the kind of terrorism that Arab countries have more recently exercised against Western countries, the translation became even easier seeing as the events were more current and employed terms that are still being referred to and are frequently used in journalism, internet and television news. It was interesting to read how the author predicted what would very likely happen, and has indeed happened the way he thought it would. He writes about the economic implications as well as the

social disruptions. Looking back it is easy to see that many of these forecasts were correct.

The fact that the author decided to address the situation in the Islamic State of Iran is important, in that it is still an ongoing and even escalating situation. We can learn from the various features mentioned in the text why we have terrorist attacks, and can sometimes even predict them based on how current events are analyzed. For example, preparation for attacks is relatively obvious to those who understand what is needed to set up such an attack. Over the past decade or more it has been shown that the Western countries are far more critical and suspicious of where something may be going on that has potential for getting out of control and become a serious threat.

The article was informative to read, well written and clearly enough structures in order to render a coherent and understandable translation.

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